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I. Introduction
Humanitarian law contains no stronger doctrine than the Principle of Distinction. The
principle is as unequivocal as it is inflexible: parties to a conflict must "direct their operations
only against military objectives."' When parties target non-military objectives such as ci-
vilians, they violate international law. The Principle of Distinction is widely accepted and
constitutes the core doctrine of the law of war.2
Yet the Principle of Distinction is bad law. Designed with large-scale interstate wars in
mind, Distinction is inapposite to the reality of modern warfare. Distinction rests on an
outdated view of the world, and asks the impossible of the weak and little of the powerful.
It violates the ideal of equal protection of the laws, the upshot of which is to protect the
status quo from change. Instead of bringing order to war and saving lives, the Principle of
Distinction precludes the rule of law and endangers the lives of those whom it was designed
to protect. The world deserves better.
A. DOCTRINE3
The purpose of the Principle of Distinction is "to shield those who are not directly
participating in the conflict from its effects." 4 In order to accomplish this goal, the Principle
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1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art. 48, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I, 1125 U.N.T.S.
512, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1].
2. Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Centu-y Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L.J.
143, 148 (1999). See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Gean-
Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswold Beck eds., 2005).
3. Humanitarian law can be divided into two categories: (1)jis ad bellum and (2)jus in bello. Jus ad bellum
consists of the rules that govern the decision to use force, whilejus in bello contains rules about how force may
be used once the decision to do so is made. The Principle of Distinction falls in the latter category ofjus in
bello. See Schmitt, supra note 2, at 146.
4. Id. at 145.
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provides what commentators have called "an absolute moral immunity from direct, inten-
tional attack[s]" on civilians and noncombatants.5 This is not to say that attacks resulting
in civilian deaths necessarily violate humanitarian law; rather, it is a question of intent. The
Principle of Distinction provides that nonmilitary persons or objects may not be the in-
tended targets of attacks. If, however, harm to civilians is an unintended result of an oth-
erwise lawful attack, the requirement of distinction has been met.6
The prohibition on intentional targeting of civilians is "[t]he most basic principle un-
derlying the law of war .... -I It is codified in the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions.' Although not all states have ratified the Additional Protocol I, most agree
that the Protocol's statements about the Principle of Distinction express customary inter-
national law.9
The Principle of Distinction does not stand alone. Instead, it serves a gatekeeper role
regarding target selection. Each potential target must satisfy the Principle; if it does not,
the potential target can never be intentionally attacked. Even when Distinction is satisfied,
it remains to be seen if the target can be attacked in a particular instance. Two other
principles govern when targets may be attacked.
International law recognizes the Principle of Necessity.5 Necessity supplements the Prin-
ciple of Distinction by adding the requirement that destroying the target in question will
actually provide an advantage in overcoming the enemy." In the words of one of the Nu-
remburg Tribunals, "[diestruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There
must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the over-
coming of the enemy forces.' 2
The Principle of Proportionality, codified in the Additional Protocol I, prohibits attacks
"which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.""s The Principle of Proportionality rec-
ognizes that collateral damage is a part of war but attempts to reduce that damage by
requiring a balancing of the costs and benefits of a proposed attack.
The Principle of Distinction does not have the final say on whether a particular target
may lawfully be attacked in a particular instance; Necessity and Proportionality do that.
5. MajorJeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look at the Current Law on Targeting the Will
of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine., 51 A.FL. REV. 143, 146 (2001).
6. Id.
7. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 145.
8. Article 48 provides that parties to a conflict must "distinguish between the civilian population and com-
batants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives." Likewise, article 51.2 states that "[t]he civilian population as such, as well as in-
dividual civilians, shall not be the object of attack." Finally, article 52.2 requires that "[a]ttacks shall be limited
strictly to military objectives." See Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, arts. 48, 51-52.
9. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 148.
10. See Meyer, snpra note 5, at 147 n.20. Major Meyer argues that the Principle of Necessity can also be
found in Additional Protocol I, article 52's requirement that destruction of the target provide a "military
advantage" to the attacker.
11. Id. at 147.
12. United States v. List, reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRI-
BUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10: NUERNBERG OCTOBER 1946-APRIL 1949 1230, 1253-54(1950).
13. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51.5(b).
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However, the Principle of Distinction determines what targets can ever be attacked, and
carries the heavy burden of protecting innocents from intentional harm.
B. ACCEPTANCE
Although the United States and twenty-nine other countries have not ratified the Ad-
ditional Protocol I, most governments and commentators have wholeheartedly accepted
the Principle of Distinction. 4 For example, the U.S. government recognizes that the Prin-
ciple of Distinction is a part of customary international law, even though other provisions
of the Additional Protocol I remain objectionable."5
Despite widespread official acceptance of the Principle of Distinction, the Principle is
violated time and again by governments and non-state actors. Sudan, Rwanda, the Former
Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, and the Nagoro-Karabakh region of Azer-
baijan are all places where the Principle of Distinction has been systematically violated in
recent conflicts.16
Since the end of the Cold War, the increasing frequency of intrastate and other conflicts
that do not fit the mold of state versus state has raised concerns about the Principle of
Distinction. 7 It can be unclear whether non-state parties to a conflict, who often are prac-
tically indistinguishable from the civilian population, are bound by, or protected by, the
Principle of Distinction." Furthermore, the weaker parties to asymmetrical conflicts may
be tempted to abandon the Principle of Distinction because of the constraints it imposes
on their ability to wage war.'9 On top of all that, combatants motivated by notions of
morality or ethnicity are particularly indiscriminate in their targeting decisions.20
If rhetoric were all that mattered, the Principle of Distinction would be an ironclad and
fundamental doctrine of international law. Yet the reality is far different: the Principle of
Distinction is violated across the world, often openly so, and that problem is getting worse.
Something must be done.
C. PURPOSE OF THE PAPER
The Principle of Distinction must be abandoned. This paper argues that the Principle
of Distinction should be replaced with a more nuanced doctrine-one that is both prac-
ticable and fair. After discussing the problems with the Principle of Distinction, this paper
ends by suggesting how those problems might be avoided under different legal rules.
It is worth taking a moment to discuss what this paper is not about. It is not about
justifications for armed conflict, nor about the criteria for determining whether a state of
14. Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed
Conflict, 98 Am.J. IsI,'L. L. 1, 15 (2004).
15. Id. at 15 n.99; see, e.g., Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of
Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U.J.INr'L L.
& POL'y 419 (1987); Abraham D. Sofaer, AGORA: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 Am. J. I, r'L L. 784 (1988).
16. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 158.
17. R.M. ALLEY, INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: WARS WITHOUT END? 115
(2004).
18. Watkin, supra note 14, at 17.
19. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 156-57.
20. Id. at 158.
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war exists in a given situation. From the outset, this paper will bypass these questions ofjus
ad belum and focus exclusively on jus in bello. Furthermore, the paper is not about wars
between powerful states. Such wars are increasingly rare, replaced by smaller, less clear-cut
confrontations involving insurgents and weak states. This paper inspects humanitarian law
in light of these modern wars, wars that are often between a physically weak party and a
much stronger party. Specifically, this paper is about how the realities of asymmetrical
warfare should affect the humanitarian law doctrine of the Principle of Distinction. Other
points of law, such as the Principles of Necessity and Proportionality, will be discussed only
in relation to Distinction.
The central question addressed by this paper thus stands out in sharp relief: who can be
attacked? For decades, the Principle of Distinction has answered this question by dividing
the world into two categories: military and nonmilitary. The former can be attacked, the
latter cannot.2
This paper questions that division both morally and practically. Part I summarizes the
origins of the Principle of Distinction and how Distinction has developed into the corner-
stone doctrine of humanitarian law. Part 11 examines how the Principle of Distinction is
practiced today, both by powerful states and by weaker non-state actors. In Part I1, the
paper describes a variety of problems with the Principle of Distinction. Most damningly,
the Principle violates the ideal of equal protection of the laws, its results are often nonsen-
sical, and it is difficult to apply to real-world situations. Often, Distinction cannot be fol-
lowed by weaker parties to conflicts. The flawed doctrine of Distinction reduces confidence
in international law and leads parties to reject wholesale the laws of armed conflict. The
result is disorder instead of the rule of law.
The paper ends by suggesting a new doctrine, one that could take the place of Distinction
in humanitarian law. Part IV details that new doctrine, which it labels the Principle of
Culpability. That section shows how many of the shortcomings of the Principle of Dis-
tinction might be avoided with new rules.
D. TERMINOLOGY
The term "terrorism" is not used in this paper because that word is too emotionally
charged. Particularly after September 11, labeling something terrorism tends to foreclose
further analysis and eliminate the possibility of a nuanced response. Of even more concern
is the lack of a precise definition of what constitutes terrorism. As a technical matter of the
laws of war, terrorism might mean violating the Principle of Distinction by attacking ci-
vilians. Or, terrorism might mean violating the Principle of Necessity by choosing targets
based on political, not military, goals. Without consensus as to what it means, the terrorism
label confounds more than it clarifies.
From time to time, the paper will refer to "asymmetrical" warfare or conflicts. This
reference means violent conflicts in which one side possesses significantly greater military
resources than does the other. Whether the advantage is technological or numerical, asym-
metrical warfare is characterized by a material advantage enjoyed by a party over its op-
21. The Principles of Necessity and Proportionality further limit the decision to attack a given target in a
given instance, but the Principle of Distinction governs what targets can ever, under any circumstances, be
subject to attack.
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ponent. Typically, the more powerful party goes to war with troops, aircraft, tanks, and all
of the other accoutrements of modem militaries. It relies above all else on superior physical
strength to win. The weaker party, on the other hand, may use irregular soldiers and im-
provised weapons, and often prefers surprise attacks to direct engagements. Examples of
asymmetrical warfare are the ongoing post-invasion insurgency in Iraq, the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, and the separatist rebellion in Sri Lanka.
II. History
The ideal of Distinction has always been in tension with the realities of armed conflict.
At least since the American Civil War, governments have endorsed the idea that civilians
should enjoy special legal protections from attack. Yet military commanders have just as
consistently attacked civilian targets, even when they professed to believe in Distinction.
Legal reformers responded by making laws about Distinction more explicit and clear-cut,
yet violations continued throughout the Twentieth Century.
A. CIVIL WAR TO THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
During the American Civil War, President Lincoln commissioned Dr. Francis Lieber to
write a codification of the laws of war based on the customs of nations at the time.22 Lincoln
adopted the Lieber Code and issued it to the Union Army as Union Army General Order
No. 100.23 The Lieber Code recognized the Principle of Distinction:
Art. 22. Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise
steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual
belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle
has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person,
property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.2"
The customary Principle of Distinction that Lieber described is not absolute; it applies "as
much as the exigencies of war will admit."2 Furthermore, the Lieber Code acknowledged
that enemy civilians may be made to suffer, since "[t]he citizen or native of a hostile country
is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is
subjected to the hardships of the war. 26
Civilians did indeed suffer in the Civil War, not only from deprivations of food, supplies,
and manpower, but also from direct attack. Most infamously, Union General Sherman
destroyed cities, towns, farms, and infrastructure throughout the American South as part
of his "march to the sea." The Union Government may have adopted the Principle of
Distinction, but its actions evince different priorities other than protecting civilians. This
rift between law and practice would be repeated in every major conflict that followed.
22. Meyer, supra note 5, at 148.
23. Id.
24. Francis Lieber, Instructions fir the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field art. 22 (1863),
reprinted in THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988) (1973).
25. Id.
26. Id. at art. 21.
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In the immediate aftermath of the American Civil War, the Principle of Distinction
entered international positive law as part of the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868.7 The
purpose of the Declaration was to prohibit small explosive bullets, but its preamble made
the broader claim that "the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accom-
plish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy." s Although far from an
explicit rule of law, this statement summarizes the basic idea that would later grow into a
full-fledged doctrine.
B. THE WORLD WARS
In 1907, with the possibility of war already looming on the horizon, European powers
tried once again to codify the laws of war. The Hague Peace Conference of 1907 resulted
in conventions regarding bombardment from both land and sea.2 9 The Convention on Land
Warfare prohibited attacks on undefended "towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings.... "0
The Convention on Naval Forces went into greater detail, distinguishing the majority of
undefended locations from those that included industries crucial to an enemy's military
effort. 3 Such militarily useful targets, even if they were undefended, could be attacked.
What it meant for an industry or target to be of military significance is unclear. However,
these conventions do demonstrate a growing belief in the difference between civilian and
military targets.32 Undefended civilian objects were immune from attack, while undefended
military objects were seen as legitimate targets. The conventions envisioned civilian deaths
as collateral damage, not the object of attacks. In short, they required a weak form of
Distinction.
The First World War tested states' commitments to Distinction. With conflict on an
unprecedented scale and civilian-controlled industries central to the war effort, the temp-
tation to attack non-military targets was great. Nonetheless, Major Jeanne Meyer, a Judge
Advocate with the U.S. Air Force, has concluded that, "[tihe bombing campaigns of Britain,
France, Germany, Italy, and America all reflect adherence to two, interrelated principles of
international law: (1) the only legitimate targets are military objectives; and (2) indiscrim-
inate bombing is prohibited.""
That said "military objectives" was interpreted to include war industries, regardless of
whether civilian workers would be killed. 4 Even more expansively, "the parties in WWI
considered affecting enemy morale, including that of civilians, to be a legitimate, and per-
haps desirable, consequence of aerial bombardment."" Therefore, although civilians were
not targeted, there was no effort to avoid killing them either.36 Although they adhered to
the letter of the Principle of Distinction, the combatants in WWI did not follow its spirit.
27. Meyer, supra note 5, at 149.
28. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight (1868),
reprinted in THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 24.
29. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277;
Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351.
30. Convention (IV), supra note 29, art. 25.
31. Convention (IX), supra note 29, art. 2.
32. Meyer, supra note 5, at 149.
33. Id. at 154.
34. Id. at 155.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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After WVWI, it was clear that warfare had changed. Increasingly advanced weapons, par-
ticularly aircraft, provided commanders with the ability to strike targets that were distant
from the front lines. Civilian populations were at risk like never before, and the international
legal community responded by proposing detailed and stringent rules of combat.
The Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923 was the most ambitious proposal. Written by
jurists at the Hague, the 1923 Rules would have banned terrorizing civilians, damaging
private non-military property, injuring non-combatants, and bombing to collect funds. 37 In
addition, the 1923 Rules provided a list of legitimate targets including "military forces;
military works; military establishments or depots; factories constituting important and well-
known cent[e]rs engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition or distinctively military
supplies; lines of communications or transportation used for military purposes." 38 This list
was intended to be exhaustive; attacks on targets that did not fall into one of the enumerated
categories were banned under the 192 3 Rules. The rules do not endorse attacks against the
morale of an enemy's civilians. Indeed, the ban on terrorizing civilians could be interpreted
as specifically forbidding attacks directed against civilian morale. 39 In short, the rules were
a ringing endorsement of the Principle of Distinction. But not a single country adopted
the 1923 Rules? °
Instead of adopting laws about Distinction, countries issued non-binding policy state-
ments during the interwar period. British Prime Minister Chamberlain proposed three
principles: (1) that it was illegal to bomb or deliberately attack civilians; (2) targets attacked
from the air must be identified military objectives; and (3) military objectives must be
attacked with reasonable care so civilians are not hurt.4' The League of Nations adopted
these principles in a non-binding resolution in 1938.4
2
At the same time, military commanders were increasingly willing to attack civilian morale.
Sophisticated air forces gave militaries the ability to engage in strategic bombardment, in
which they attacked the entire enemy nation, not just fielded troops. 43 The idea was to
choose targets "'not because of any direct or necessary relationship with the enemy's forces
in the field, but because their destruction would undermine the enemy nation's willingness
and capability to wage war at all."'- The commander of the Royal Air Force defined military
objectives as "any objectives which will contribute effectively towards the destruction of the
enemy's means of resistance and the lowering of his determination to fight."
45
It was as if military commanders and civilian politicians were speaking different lan-
guages. On the one hand were statements of principle that seemed to disavow any desire
to attack civilians; on the other, the idea of strategic bombardment. This break continued
37. Herman Reinhold, Target Lists: A 1923 Idea with Applications for the Future, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 1,12 (2002).
38. The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, art. 24.2, reprinted in THE LAWS Of ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 24.
39. Id. at art. 22.
40. Reinhold, supra note 37, at 13. Delegates from Great Britain, the United States, Italy, France, Holland,
and Japan met for three months to discuss the 1923 Rules.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id.
43. See ROBERT FRANK FUTRELL, IDEAS, CONCEPTS, DOCTRINE: BASIC THINKING IN THE U.S. AIR FORCE 1907-
1960 11 (1989).
44. Meyer, supra note 5, at 157.
45. SIR CHARLES WEBSTER & NOBLE FRANKLAND, THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY 1939-
45, 74 (1961).
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right up to the beginnings of the Second World War. On September 1, 1939, the day
Germany invaded Poland, President Roosevelt sought agreement from European govern-
ments that they would not bomb "civilian populations in unfortified cities." 46 France, En-
gland, and Germany agreed.47
Perhaps never in the history of armed conflict has a promise been more thoroughly
broken. By 1945, both Allied and Axis powers were targeting entire cities with the explicit
intention of harming their civilian populations. The Allies firebombed Dresden and Tokyo,
Germany attacked London with V-I and V-2 rockets, and the United States dropped nu-
clear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.48 Yet attacking civilian targets was not originally
the goal of American and British commanders. Rather, the targeting of enemy civilians was
something that the Allies gradually decided to do-the Principle of Distinction was weak-
ened before being abandoned.
Ever since the American entrance into the war, both the Royal Air Force and the Army
Air Corps practiced strategic bombardment. However, at first they disagreed over the means
by which enemy civilian morale should be affected. 49 The British were initially "more dis-
posed to considering Germany's morale as a specific objective"1 ° The Americans, on the
other hand, preferred to affect morale indirectly by attacking the economic systems of
Germany and other Axis powers.5 Under this mixture of direct and indirect approaches,
the Principle of Distinction was seriously weakened. By permitting civilian morale to some-
times be the target of attack, it became increasingly difficult to argue that there was a
difference between civilian and military targets.
Distinction was abandoned altogether in 1943. In January of that year, President Roo-
sevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met in Casablanca to discuss war strategy. At the end
of their meeting, they issued the joint Casablanca Directive, a document that endorsed
direct and intentional targeting of German civilian morale. 2 The Directive adopted the
objective of "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial
and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point
where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."" Distinction, already
watered-down beyond recognition, seemed dead.
C. THF COLD WAR . . . AND CODIFICATION
After the 1923 Air Rules were unanimously rejected, there were no more attempts to
codify the Principle of Distinction until the 1950s. Prompted by the civilian costs of WW-I,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposed expanding the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 to include Distinction14 "In particular, members of the ICRC sought
to regulate, if not prohibit, the employment of aerial bombardment beyond the immediate
46. Reinhold, supra note 37, at 15.
47. J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTs 259-60 (The University Press Aberdeen 3d ed. 1947) (1924).
48. See Reinhold, supra note 37, at 16-17.
49. Meyer, supra note 5, at 158-59.
50. Id. at 158.
51. Id. at 159.
52. RicHARD G. DAvis, CARL A. SPAATZ AND THE AIR WAR IN EUROPE 589 (1993).
53. WEBSTER & FRANKLAND, supra note 45, app. 8, pt. 28.
54. Meyer, supra note 5, at 160-61.
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battlefield"" The Institute of International Law and the United Nations also drafted pro-
posals, but "support for the proposals among major powers was tepid, at best."56 None of
the proposals were adopted and the issue was eventually dropped.
Distinction made a modest comeback, at least in practice, at the beginning of the Korean
War.57 American commanders avoided striking civilian targets so that the North Koreans
would not be able to gain international sympathy for being subjected to "illegal" attacks.58
However, once the Chinese military intervened on behalf of the North, the American Air
Force ceased to distinguish between civilian and military targets.5 9 The Air Force attacked
"communications systems and towns, cities and villages.... Some air attacks were designed
to destroy the morale of civilians who supported the enemy. This included bombing targets
around Pyongyang, after leaflets had warned residents prior to the attack."
60
The Principle of Distinction continued to be ignored in the Vietnam War. Although
aerial bombardment of civilians and civilian structures was less common than in Korea, the
American infantry destroyed towns and villages, and was widely reported to be intentionally
killing civilians.61 In addition, the use of Agent Orange and napalm resulted in significant
damage to civilian food supplies.
62
In that context, the idea that the Principle of Distinction should be codified was resur-
rected in 1974. This time, the ICRC managed to bring a wide range of countries together
to form the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (the Diplomatic Conference).63 After
three years of deliberation, the Diplomatic Conference drafted and submitted Additional
Protocols I and 1I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Additional Protocol I contains explicit
provisions limiting targets to military objectives, and protecting civilians from intentional
attack.64 As discussed in the introduction to this paper, not all states have signed the Ad-
ditional Protocol I. Nonetheless, most, including the United States, agree that the Proto-
col's statements about distinction reflect international custom and opiniojuris. After a cen-
tury of inconsistent rhetoric and practice to the contrary, Distinction was law.
D. THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
In the first Gulf War, American targeting decisions were guided by the ideas of U.S. Air
Force Colonel John Warden who advocated destroying an enemy's "[c] enters of gravity."
65
Centers of gravity included "those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which the
55. W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.EL. REv. 1, 64 (1990).
56. Meyer, supra note 5, at 161; see also, International Committee for the Red Cross, Draft Rules for the
Limitations of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Times of War (1956), reprinted in THE LAws oF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 24.
57. Reinhold, supra note 37, at 18-19.
58. See Thomas C. Hone, Strategic Bombing Constrained: Korea and Vietnam, in CASE STUDIES IN STRATEGIC
BOMBARDMENT 473 (R. Cargill Hall ed., 1998).
59. Reinhold, supra note 37, at 19.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INCENDIARY WEAPONS 49-58 (1975).
63. Meyer, supra note 5, at 161.
64. Protocol Additional I, supra note 1, arts. 48, 51-52.
65. Reinhold, supra note 37, at 20, quoting Richard G. Davis, Strategic Bombing in the Gulf War, in CASE
STUDIES, supra note 58, at 535.
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enemy derives his freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."66 Warden's broad
targeting criteria necessarily included many objects that are primarily civilian in nature,
such as power plants, communications facilities, and oil refineries. Indeed, all of these were
attacked during the Gulf War.67 On the other hand, although civilian structures were tar-
geted by American and coalition forces, "[t]he U.S. used precision-guided munitions to
limit civilian deaths." s6 General Colin Powell, speaking for the Department of Defense,
reported to Congress that the Principle of Distinction had been adhered to by the American
military in its conduct during the war.61
Interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 continued the sort of targeting
decisions made in the Gulf War. Planners for Operation Deliberate Force used the idea of
centers of gravity when deciding what targets to attack in Bosnia.7o Out of political consid-
erations, if nothing else, they constructed detailed rules of engagement designed to limit
civilian deaths and suffering."1 However, civilian targets were deliberately attacked. During
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, NATO forces attacked a radio and television station
that they considered to be a primary center of gravity for the Serbian government, as well
as power stations, factories, and bridges.3 NATO considered the Serbian government's use
of these facilities to be classic examples of dual uses, and thus legitimate grounds for at-
tacking civilian objects.74
E. THE POINT OF HISTORY
The history of the Principle of Distinction is not just background information. Under-
standing where the Principle came from sheds light on what it is and why it is that way.
"[A]dvances in humanitarian law have tracked major conflicts with great regularity," and
nowhere is this more apparent than for the Principle of Distinction. 7" As wars between
states became increasingly violent and civilian suffering increased, lawmakers wrote more
explicit protections for civilians into humanitarian law. Additional Protocol I is a direct
response to the enormous dangers to civilians during the Cold War, and that is telling
because the Cold War, like WAVII, WWI and the American Civil War, was a conflict
66. Id.
67. See COL. RICHARD T. REYNOLDS, HEART OF THE STORM: THE GENESIS OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST
IRAQ 54 (1995).
68. Reinhold, supra note 37, at 21.
69. GENERAL COLIN POWELL, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, Pub. Law
No.102-25, at 696-703 (1992).
70. Id; see also Col. Maris McCrabb, US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign Planning, in DELIBERATE FORCE: A
CASE STUDY IN EFFECTIVE AIR CAMPAIGNING: FINAL REPORT OF THE AIR UNIVERSITY BALKANS AIR CAMPAIGN
STUDY 65-81 (Col. Robert C. Owen ed., 2000).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO
BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVLA, http://www.un.org/icty/pressreaV/
nato061300.htm.
73. Id.
74. For a critique of collateral damage during the Kosovo campaign, see Amnesty International, "Collateral
Damage" or Unlawfid Killings? Violations of the Law of War by NATO During Operation Allied Force, June 2000,
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/kosovo/docs/natorep-all.doc; see also Human Rights Watch, Ticking Tinge
Bombs; NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia, June 1999, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nato2/
index.htm.
75. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 145-46.
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between states. Although Vietnam was fresh in the mind of the Protocol's drafters, they
created a Principle of Distinction doctrine firmly in line with its predecessors; one premised
on the idea of major interstate conflict. The Cold War was a war that would be fought with
millions of troops across entire continents, and one in which the goals of the combatants
were relatively clear-cut. Because the Principle of Distinction made sense in that context
does not necessarily mean that it makes sense today.
MI. Current Practice
Wars between powerful states, those conflicts that prompted the development of hu-
manitarian law, are increasingly rare. Instead of large-scale combat between organized mil-
itaries, modem warfare is becoming asymmetrical. Insurgencies, not armies, are the norm.
Asymmetrical wars are ongoing in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Colombia, the D.R. Congo,
Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Indonesia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, just to name a few. Application of
the laws of war to conflicts like these is a major challenge to international law. By looking
at the examples of Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Sri Lanka, this section explores how the Prin-
ciple of Distinction is applied to asymmetrical conflicts, both in rhetoric and in practice.
A. IRAQ
The American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq has resulted in an asymmetrical con-
flict. For the first time since the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the military
strength and technical sophistication of a superpower is coming face to face with a guerrilla
insurgency. It has become a truism that "everything changed after September 11," but is
that so for Distinction? With urban fighting a reality and insurgents who are often indis-
tinguishable from civilians, the temptation for American forces to ignore Distinction might
be high. Likewise, increasing coordination between aid agencies, civilian contractors, and
the American military could tempt insurgents to disregard Distinction as well. As the
highest-profile conflict in the world today, Iraq provides a snapshot of how Distinction is
practiced and how it is preached.
Although the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, the American military
establishment openly endorses the Principle of Distinction. American armed forces include
that endorsement in their training materials, ensuring that every member of the U.S. mili-
tary is aware that civilians may not be targeted. For example, the U.S. Air Force provides
every one of its employees, military and civilian alike, with a copy of the Airman's Manual,
a small paperback instructional book.16 The Airman's Manual puts Distinction simply by
saying "Do Not ... Attack noncombatants who include civilians ... "I'
The U.S. Army includes the Principle of Distinction in its training materials as well. The
first chapter of the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, a guide for evaluating the performance
of individual soldiers, is about the laws of war.7 8 The Manual explains that the Hague
conventions and customary international law limit targeting decisions, and that the latter
prohibits "targeting or attacking civilians. ' 79 It goes on to state that civilians are protected
76. U.S. AIR FORCE, AIRMAN'S MANUAL (2004).
77. Id. at 14.
78. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, SOLDIER'S MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS: SKILL LEVEL 1(2003).
79. Id. at 3-17.
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from "all acts or threats of violence .. 8.. , 0 Likewise, the Army's field manual on the law of
land warfare says that "[aittacks [a]gainst the [c]ivilian [plopulation as [s]uch [are]
[p]rohibited."'
Of course, prohibiting attacks directed at civilian targets begs the question: what are
considered civilian targets? American military commanders continue to make targeting
decisions based on the notion of an enemy's "centers of gravity." Major Herman Reinhold,
of the U.S. Air Force, summarizes that approach as "'everything may be destroyed if there
is a military reason to destroy it."'' s For example, American targeting guidelines allow
attacks against an enemy's ability to "sustain" itself, a conceit beyond traditional definitions
of what constitutes a military target. 3
The American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq has resulted in numerous civilian
deaths. Since the U.S. military does not track civilian deaths, precise numbers are impossible
to verify.- Iraqbodycount.net provides estimates based on news reports and places the num-
ber of civilian dead between 23,589 and 26,705 as of August 16, 2005.85 But a peer-reviewed
study based on interviews with randomly selected Iraqi families suggests a much higher
civilian death toll of up to 100,000.6
Because the insurgency in Iraq is composed of many disparate groups and movements,
it is impossible to pinpoint a unitary insurgent policy regarding Distinction." However,
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the most infamous leader of the insurgency, outlined his policies
in a letter to his followers.8s Zarqawi's work plan includes targeting not only Americans,
but Kurds, agents of the Iraqi government, and the Shiite community 9 Particularly, with
regards to Shiite targets, Zarqawi's rejection of Distinction is clear-he advocates attacking
80. Id. at 3-24.
81. DEPARTMENT OF THE AaMY, THE LAw oF LAND WARFARE (1956). Although published in 1956, this remains
the Army's current field manual on this topic.
82. Reinhold, supra note 37, at 41.
83. The U.S. Air Force Intelligence Targeting guide says that
[m]ilitary objectives include those objects that by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an
effective contribution to military action, or whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization
offers a definite military advantage. The key factor is whether the object contributes to the enemy's
war fighting or war sustaining capability.
Catherine Wallis, Legitimate Targets of Attack: Considerations when Targeting in a Coalition, in THE ARMY LAWYER
44, 49-50 (Dec. 2004); U.S. Department of Air Force, USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide, Feb. 1998, pars. 1.71;
see also U.S. Departmnet of Navy, The Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, Oct. 1995, para.
8.1.1.
84. See John Allen Paulos, Last Word: the Fital Statistics of War, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/life/lastword/story/0,, 1374187,00.html.
85. See The Iraq Body Count Database, http://www.iraqbodycount.net (last visited on Sept. 11, 2005). This
site collates reports from major news publications. It requires two independent news agencies to report a civilian
death before it is counted.
86. Les Roberts et. al., Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey, 364 THE
LANCET 1857 (2004). Of the civilian deaths recorded, only 5% were due to coalition small arms fire, the majority
were the result of attacks from coalition artillery and aircraft.
87. Walter Pincus, CIA Studies Provide Glimpse of Insurgents in Iraq, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2005, at A19. The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) divides the insurgents into: (1) former Baathists; (2) newly radicalized Sunnis;
(3) Iraqi nationalists; and (4) foreign fighters associated with Zarqawi.
88. Letter attributed to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.iraqcoalition.org/transcript-
index.html.
89. Id.
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religious symbols and the Shia themselves. Zarqari intends to pull out the teeth of the Shia
population in anticipation of a Sunni-Shia civil war.90 The insurgency has followed through
on its plans to attack civilians. There have been numerous instances where insurgents have
detonated bombs in civilian markets and along busy civilian streets. Sometimes these attacks
are intended to kill U.S. soldiers in the area, but other attacks are conducted with no
apparent connection to military targets. For example, insurgents bombed a Baghdad res-
taurant on December 31, 2003, killing five civilians and wounding thirty. Shi'a pilgrims
celebrating the Ashura religious holiday were attacked with roadside bombs on March 2,
2004, in Karbala, killing eighty-five and wounding 230.91
On August 30, 2003, a car bomb exploded outside the holiest Shi'a Muslim site in Iraq,
the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. The blast killed 124-including one of Shi'a Islam's most
prominent clerics, Ayatollah Mohammad Bakir al-Haqim-and wounded 142 more. This
attack was not an isolated incident--there have been numerous other car bombings of Iraqi
mosques in recent months, including one that detonated outside a Shi'a mosque in Baghdad
on January 9, 2004, killing five and wounding thirty-seven, and a bombing against a Bagh-
dad mosque on March 2, 2004, that killed fifty-eight and wounded 200.92
The Lancet study attributed approximately 2.7 percent of the violent deaths recorded
"to anti-coalition forces ..."91
In addition to killing Iraqi civilians, insurgents also take civilian hostages. 94 Human Rights
Watch estimates that during a single week in April 2004, insurgents took between thirteen
and forty non-Iraqis hostage.9 Hostages are often aid workers or civilian contractors, and
frequently, they are killed by their captors.96 Even if hostages are ultimately released, taking
civilian hostages violates the Principle of Distinction. Distinction forbids combatants from
directing operations against civilians; yet that is precisely what hostage-takers do.
B. ISRAEL AND PALESTINE
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the longest-running asymmetrical wars in the
world.97 For over fifty years, there has been ongoing violence between the Israeli govern-
ment and Palestinian militants.9" The violence has been more or less intense at times, but
it has never ended. 99 Before the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Palestinian-
90. Id.
91. Nathan A. Canestaro, "Small Wars" and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the Insurgents in Iraq, 43 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 126-27 (2004).
92. Id.
93. Roberts et al., supra note 86, at 1860-61. Figure obtained by adding total violent deaths after invasion
outside of Falluja (21) to total violent deaths after invasion in Falluja (52) and dividing by the number of violent
deaths attributable to anti-coalition forces.
94. Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Avoid Harm to Civilians, Apr. 16, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/
04/16/iraq8446.htm.
95. Id.
96. See T. Christian Miller, The Conflict in Iraq; To Rebuild Amid Danger: an Alliance; Private contractors work
with U.S. forces, sharing intelligence and workload, in their 'combat reconstruction' of the Volatile Nation, THE L.A.
T IMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at A4.
97. See, e.g., BERNARD REICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ISRAEL (2005). At the time of writing, a semi-formal
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Israeli conflict was the highest profile conflict anywhere, yet neither international attention
nor international law has persuaded either side to distinguish between civilians and non-
civilians.
Israel has not ratified Additional Protocol 1.100 Nonetheless, Israel Defense Force (IDF)
statements suggest agreement with Distinction. "IDF soldiers will not use their weapons
and force to harm human beings who are not combatants or prisoners of war, and will do
all in their power to avoid causing harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property."10 1
However, the IDF conspicuously omits international law from its lists of binding authorities
stating that "IDF soldiers will operate according to the IDF values and orders, while ad-
hering to the laws of the state and norms of human dignity, and honoring the values of the
State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state." 102 The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
acknowledges the laws of war, but justifies military operations against civilian targets as
being allowed by military necessity.103
Israel, through the IDF, targets and destroys Palestinian homes, both as punishment and
as a preventative measure. 1°4 Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel has destroyed nearly
2,500 Palestinian homes in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.1 5 The pace of home de-
struction increased during the latest round of Palestinian attacks as evidenced by statistics
showing that "[s]ince ... September 2000, Israel has destroyed 675 Palestinian homes as
punishment for Palestinian attacks, leaving 4,239 people homeless."'6 Home destruction
is not merely the policy of the Israeli military-it has been approved by Israel's highest
court. 10 7 The Israeli High Court of Justice has rejected constitutional and international law
arguments against a plan to destroy hundreds of Palestinian homes near the Egyptian border
in order to create a buffer zone ahead of Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. 08 The
Court also ruled in favor of Israel's policy of destroying the homes of suicide bombers'
families.0 9 Although at the present time Israel has halted the destruction of Palestinian
homes, the fact remains that Israel is willing to destroy civilian objects when it deems it
expedient. Nothing suggests that Israel has changed its fundamental interpretation of its
right to self-defense. Therefore, from Israel's point of view, self-restraint is more an act of
grace than of following the law.
The IDF's operations also result in numerous civilian deaths. For example, Israeli in-
cursions into the Jabaliya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip in the fall of 2004 resulted in the
100. INTERNATIONAL COMM ITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, STATES PARTY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 7 (2004) [hereinafter STATES PARTY]
101. Israel Defense Force, Doctrine, http://wwwl.idfilVDOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl = EN&id = 32 (last
visited Sept. 12, 2005).
102. Id.
103. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Demolition of Palestinian Structures Used for Terrorism -Legal
Background, May 18, 2004, http://www.mfa.gov.ilVMFAFerrorism- + Obstacle + to + Peace/Terror + Groups/.
104. See Greg Myre, Israel Halts Decades-Old Practice of Demolishing Militants' Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2005, at A4. At the time of this writing, Israel has halted home demolitions. Whether this marks a permanent
change in Israeli policy remains to be seen; the fact that Israel has destroyed homes until now indicates that
Israel considers this to be a legitimate form of self-defense.
105. Id. (citing the human rights group BTselem).
106. Id.
107. See Harvey Morris, Gaza Crisis Casts Pall Over New US Search for Peace, THE FIN. TIMES (London ed.),
May 17, 2004, at 7.
108. Id.
109. Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson, Israel Widens its Range of Reprisals, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
2002, at A12.
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deaths of twenty children." 0 Of course, civilian deaths are not necessarily indicative of
violations of the Principle of Distinction. Large-scale civilian deaths can occur even when
proper military objectives are targeted. So-called "collateral damage" is illegal under inter-
national law only when it violates either the Principles of Proportionality or of Necessity."'
But when collateral damage is very great in relation to military goals, the attacks in question
begin to seem more like violations of Distinction than of Proportionality or Necessity.
It is difficult to identify consistent policies of Palestinian militant organizations regarding
distinction. The three major groups, Hamas, IslamicJihad, and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,
do not make their targeting policies public. Nonetheless, Hamas' public statements do
provide some guidance.
Hamas does not accept the Principle of Distinction. Hamas does not accept any part of
international law as binding: it is only willing to be governed by its interpretations of Islam.
Discussing the permissibility of suicide attacks, Hamas holds that
[t]he criteria used to determine whether such operations are lawful and justified must and can
only be an Islamic one. That is, the judgment must be made according to Quran and Sunnah,
and them alone. All other criteria or standards of judgment must be rejected. To do otherwise,
is un-Islamic.'12
Hamas claims that it is justified in attacking Israeli civilians as retaliation for Israeli attacks
on Palestinian civilians." 3 The Qassam Brigades, a military wing of Hamas, in its standard
press release regarding attacks against Israeli settlements, states, "[tihis is a natural reaction
[to] the Zionist aggression against our innocent civilians .... -14
Hamas and other organizations have indicated that they are willing to consider some
form of distinction. Adnan Asfour, a spokesperson for Hamas, has said that Hamas would
stop targeting civilians if Israel were to do likewise."ll Hamas is, therefore, at least poten-
tially willing to acknowledge some difference between civilians and non-civilians. Most
recently, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have agreed to halt attacks within "'the occupied Pal-
estinian land of 1967.""'1 This was an extension of an earlier pledge to cease attacks against
civilians in Israel itself." 7 The fact that these organizations conceptually separate Israelis in
Israel from Israelis in Palestine demonstrates a willingness to at least make distinctions
within the civilian population itself.
110. Press Release, Amnesty International, Israel/Occupied Territories: Excessive use of Force (Oct. 5,2004),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE 150952004?open&of= ENG-ISR. [hereinafterIs-
rael/Occupied]
111. Id.
112. Hamasonline, Islamic Resistance Movement, Martyrdom Operations in Islam, http://hamasonline.org/
indexx.php?page= Qassam/martyrdom%20operations (last visited on Sept. 11,2005).
113. Hamas Spokesman: Shedding Palestinian Blood Leads to Shedding Jewish Blood, http://
hamasonline.com.
114. Ezzedeen AI-Qassam Brigades, Firing Five Mortar Shells on the Enemy Sites of South Gaza Strip, Nov.
19, 2004, www.alqassam.info/english/statements/49.htn.
115. Asfour Before His Arrest: We Are Ready to Spare Civilians, Dec. 23, 2003, www. hamasonline.com. Al-
though it is impossible to verify that this is actually a website run by Hamas, its materials are consistent with
public statements of that organization.
116. Joel Greenberg, Fatah Signals Readiness for Mideast Truce; Prisoner Release Still on the Table, THE CHI
TkiBUTE, Feb. 2, 2005, at 3.
117. Id.
FALL 2005
748 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Militant Palestinian organizations have killed hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians in
Israel and the occupied territories. Although specific policies of the various groups differ,
the major armed groups share a willingness to target civilians in pursuit of their goals. For
example, the Qassam Brigades has repeatedly attacked Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip
with homemade rockets." 8 In May of 2003, IslamicJihad claimed responsibility for killing
a pregnant Israeli civilian and her four children? 19 OnJanuary 13, 2005, the al Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade killed five Israeli civilians with a bomb at a border crossing between Israel and
Gaza. 20 All three groups use suicide bombers to attack Israeli civilians in both Israel and
the Palestinian territories. 2' The U.S. Department of State estimates that in the year 2003,
the most recent year for which figures are available, Palestinian militants killed almost 200
people; in 2002, that number was 350.122
C. SRI LANKA
For over twenty years, the government of Sri Lanka has been engaged in a civil war with
separatist insurgents.'23 The conflict is based on ethnicity, with Tamil populations in the
north trying to secede from the Sinhalese majority.1 4 The insurgency is led by the Liber-
ation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), a well-organized force that, as of this writing, exercises
effective control over large portions of northern Sri Lanka.2' The parties continue to ob-
serve a 2002 ceasefire, although sporadic violence continues, with limited progress towards
a final solution. 2 ' Since the conflict began, hundreds of thousands of civilians, mostly Tam-
ils, have fled Sri Lanka.'27
The parties' attitudes towards Distinction are ambiguous. Sri Lanka is not a party to
Additional Protocol I; therefore, although Distinction's status as customary international
law binds it as a technical matter, the government has never formally accepted the Principle
of Distinction. 2
118. See, e.g., Qassam Brigades Fire 90 Missiles at Zionist Settlements in Three Days, Apr. 23, 2004, http//
www.hamasonline.com.
119. Eric Silver, Palestinians Murder Pregnant Israeli and Her Four Daughters, THE INDEPENDENT, May 3,
2004, at 19.
120. Ian MacKinnon, Eight Die in Gaza Raid, THE TIMES (London ed.), Jan. 14, 2005, at 44.
121. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003 (Apr. 2004), available at http://
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls.pgtrpt/2003.
122. Id.
123. For an overview of the conflict, with particular emphasis on the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement between
the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, see The Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, http://www.slmm.lk/(last
visited Sept. 12, 2005); see also The BBC, Country profile: Sri Lanka, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/
country-profiles/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2005); see also Zachary E. McCabe, Northern Ireland: the Paramilitaries,
Terrorism, and Sept. 11, 30 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 547, 566 (2002).
124. Tamils make up approximately 18% of the Sri Lankan population, while Sinhalese constitute 74%.
These ethnic groups are not evenly distributed; Tamils concentrate in the northern coastal areas, while Sinhalese
dominate the south and the interior. Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, supra note 123.
125. See Tamil Eelam Homepage, http://eelam.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
126. McCabe, supra note 123, at 566.
127. BBC Country Profile, supra note 123; see also Human Rights Watch, Canada: Prime Minister Should Call
on Tamil Tigers to End Child Soldier Use, Feb. 9, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/02/O9/canada
10151.htim.
128. STATES PARTY, supra note 100.
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The LTTE's leader, Velupillai Pirapaharan, has explicitly denied targeting civilians.1 2 9
Although his comments to this effect were made in 1986 at the beginning of the insurgency,
they remain the LTTE's clearest statements regarding Distinction. Pirapaharan has said,
"[t]he LTTE has never killed any civilians. We condemn such acts of violence." 13 0 However,
this embrace of Distinction is limited. In its rhetoric, the LTTE distinguishes between
civilians who are not involved in the ethnic conflict and those who are, either by virtue of
their having taken up arms against Tamils or by settling in "Tamil portions" of the island.'
3
'
When Sinhalese attack Tamils or "forcibly occupy" Tamil land, the LTTE no longer con-
siders those Sinhalese civilians and will attack them.'32
In practice, the LTE appears more willing to target civilians than Pirapaharan acknowl-
edges.,33 Once the ceasefire with the government went into effect in 2002, the LTTE began
a campaign to consolidate its position within the Tamil community. According to Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International,
At least 22 people with links to Tamil political parties opposed to the LTTE have been killed
in politically motivated attacks since the government of Sri Lanka and the LTE signed a
ceasefire in February 2002. Many others have been abducted, their fate still unknown. In several
instances, witnesses have identified the perpetrators as members of the LTTE. All available
evidence points to a systematic campaign by the LT=E to silence opposition voices.1
4
Under the terms of the ceasefire, the international Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission receives
and rules on complaints against both the government and the L=TE. Between January 2,
2002 and November 30, 2004, the Monitoring Mission received a total of 5319 complaints
against the LTTE and 1001 complaints against the government. 31 Of these, the Monitoring
Mission determined that the LTTE had committed fifty-five "[hiostile acts against the
civilian population" and that the government committed nine such acts.' 36
129. Interview by Jasvinger Singh with Velupillai Pirapaharan, Tamil National Leader (Mar. 23, 1986),
available at http://eelam.com; Interview by Sudip Mazumdar with Velupillai Pirapaharan, Tamil National
Leader (Aug. 11, 1986), available at http://eelam.com.
130. Mazumdar, supra note 129.
131. Singh, supra note 129.
132. Id.
133. The LTTE's use of child soldiers also impinges on the Principle of Distinction. Reports suggest that
the LITE forcibly recruits child soldiers, often by intimidating their families. Although the use of child soldiers
does not fit the traditional notion of the law of the Principle of Distinction because it does not involve targeting
an enemy, it is an example of violence against civilians. For a statement opposing forceful recruitment of child
soldiers, see Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Tamil Tigers Forcibly Recruit Child Soldiers, http://hrw.org-
english/docs/2004/1 l/10/slanka9651 .hu (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
134. Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Rights Groups Say LTTE-linked Killings Continue with Impunity,
http://hrw.org/press/2003/08/srilanka080703.hon (last visited Sept. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Sri Lanka: Rights
Groups]; see also Amnesty International, Open letter to Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and Sri Lankan Police concerning recent politically motivated killings and ab-
ductions in Sri Lanka, http://web.amnesty.orglibrary/Index/ENGASA370042003?open&of ENG-LKA(last
visited Sept. 12, 2005).
135. Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission, supra note 123.
136. Id. Figures for the years prior to 2002 are not available because the Monitoring Mission did not come
into existence, and thus begin receiving complaints, until that time.
FALL 2005
750 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
D. SUMMARY OF PRACTICE
The Principle of Distinction has not fared well in recent conflicts. Neither the United
States, nor Israel or Sri Lanka is a party to Additional Protocol I.'"1 Of the many parties
involved in the three conflicts profiled, only the United States has resolved to be bound by
the international laws of armed conflict. Israel and the United States both endorse distin-
guishing between civilians and non-civilians, yet Israel targets civilian property as a matter
of course. Israel and the United States each conduct operations that involve high levels of
civilian casualties.
While states press the boundaries of the Principle of Distinction, insurgents openly vi-
olate it. Iraqi insurgents, Hamas, IslamicJihad, al Aqsa Martyrs Bridage, and the LTTE all
target people who are protected civilians under international law.' Thousands of civilians
have been intentionally killed by insurgents in Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Sri Lanka. 19
However, insurgents' rejections of Distinction are not absolute. Of the three insurgent
groups profiled, only those in Iraq appear totally unwilling to place limits on target selec-
tion. Because Zarqawi's goal is ethnic conflict between Iraq's Muslims, he actually places a
premium on attacking Shiite civilians. 4 Yet ethnic elements to a conflict need not preclude
distinction. Palestinian and Tamil insurgents have stated a willingness to distinguish be-
tween different segments of the Israeli and Sinhalese civilian populations.-' Palestinian
militant organizations have said that they see a difference between Israeli civilians in Israel
and Israeli civilians in Palestine.42 Likewise, the LTTE argues that Sinhalese civilians who
attack Tamils or occupy Tamil land do not deserve the same protections as Sinhalese civil-
ians who do neither.' 41 It is not that insurgents always reject distinction-it is that they
reject the categorical Principle of Distinction that is currently law.
IV. Problems with Distinction
The Principle of Distinction is a seriously flawed legal doctrine. In many situations, it is
ambiguous. Even when Distinction's requirements are clear, they are often illogical. Applied
to the real world, Distinction benefits powerful states to the disadvantage of weaker actors.
It thus entrenches the status quo, leading insurgents and weak states to reject the law and
wage war without restraints.
A. DUAL-USE TARGETS
Although Distinction is normally expressed as a blanket prohibition on targeting civilians
and civilian objects, it is unclear what that prohibition means in practice. The most common
criticism of the Principle of Distinction is that it is uncertain how to apply the Principle to
dual-use targets. 44 If dual-use targets can be attacked, it begs the question: what uses count?
137. See Matheson, supra note 15; Sofaer, supra note 15.
138. See Martyrdom, supra note 112.
139. See Paulos, supra note 84; Israel/Occupied, supra note 110, Sri Lanka: Rights Groups, supra note 134.
140. See aI-Zarqawi, supra note 88.
141. See Greenberg, supra note 116.
142. Id.
143. See Singh, supra note 129.
144. See, e.g., Watkin, supra note 14, at 15-18; Schmitt, supra note 2 At 149.
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Civilian assets contribute to military strength in a variety of ways, and humanitarian law
has tried to respond by limiting the reach of Distinction's protections. Confusion has been
the result, and what appears to be a simple rule turns out to be ambiguous.
Distinction limits attacks to military objectives.141 Yet in many situations, potential targets
serve both military and civilian functions, such as power plants, bridges, and communication
facilities, to name a few. The strict separation of military and civilian assets envisioned by
Distinction simply does not exist in the real world. Applying Distinction therefore depends
upon what interpretation of the Principle one holds. As discussed above, the American
military resolves the question in favor of a weak interpretation of Distinction: it considers
all dual-use targets fair game.146 However, this weak interpretation erodes the fundamental
ideal of Distinction-that civilians should be protected. Indeed, the dual-use exception to
Distinction might devour the Principle itself. Modem militaries rely on extensive civilian
production, supply, communications, and logistical facilities. If Distinction allows attacks
against any target that contributes to an enemy's military strength, it hardly provides any
limitations on targeting at all.
The ICRC adopts a stricter interpretation of Distinction. 47 In its commentary to Ad-
ditional Protocol I, the ICRC explains that it would only allow attacks against "objects
'directly used by the armed forces' (e.g., weapons and equipment), locations of 'special
importance for military operations' (e.g., bridges), and objects intended for use or being
used for military purposes.' 4 This is a much more limited reading of dual-use than the
American interpretation. Under this interpretation, most dual-use targets would be off-
limits. Yet that reading of Distinction has its own problems. It would shield much of an
enemy's military complex from attack, thus potentially prolonging an otherwise terminable
war. Worse, it would encourage mixing civilian and military assets in order to secure the
protection of the Principle of Distinction. By creating incentives to use human shields, the
strict interpretation of Distinction might do more harm than good.
There is no consensus about what definition of military objectives is authoritative. Dif-
ferent countries follow different interpretations, and no definition is problem free. 149 The
lack of consensus about what Distinction means hampers military operations that involve
coalitions.1 ° More fundamentally, it weakens the Principle itself. Without a clear definition
of what it means to distinguish between civilian and military objectives, international hu-
manitarian law is difficult to apply and even harder to enforce.
When prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
considered bringing charges against NATO forces, they were stymied by the ambiguity of
the Principle of Distinction. The reviewing committee noted that, "[w]hen the definition
[of military objective] [sic] is applied to dual-use objects which have some civilian uses and
some actual or potential military use (communications systems, transportation systems,
petrochemical complexes, manufacturing plants of some types), opinions may differ." 5'
145. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 48.
146. See Reinhold, supra note 37; see also Wallis, supra note 83.
147. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 636 (1987).
148. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 149.
149. See Wallis, supra note 83, at 49 (regarding differences between American and allied policies, such as
those of New Zealand).
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151. Final Report, supra note 72, at IV(A)(iv)(c).
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Because the law is vague, "[slelection of certain objectives for attack may be subject to legal
debate."' The committee ultimately recommended against prosecuting NATO forces for
two reasons: (1) that further investigation was unlikely to result in sufficient evidence and
(2) that "the law is not sufficiently clear."1"3 The Principle of Distinction is just too ambig-
uous to enforce.'
B. OVER BREADTH
The Principle of Distinction is not always so difficult to apply. Regarding civilians them-
selves, instead of civilian objects, the Principle is clear: civilians may not be targeted unless
they take a "direct part in hostilities."' Yet doctrinal clarity does not guarantee rationality.
Some civilians, by virtue of their own choices, are crucial actors in wars. Modem militaries
rely on civilian contractors for a wide range of services, even in areas of active combat.
Occupying powers use civilian settlers to consolidate their control over land. Even when
they go unarmed, contractors and settlers are as important to the prosecution of wars as
soldiers, and there is little reason that they should enjoy the same protections as other
civilians.
Yet under the Principle of Distinction, contractors and settlers do receive the same pro-
tections as members of the general public.5 6 The ICRC defines "tak[ing] a direct part in
hostilities" as engaging in "acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause
actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed forces."' This restrictive
doctrine protects contractors and settlers unless they join in the fighting themselves.
Never before have civilian contractors been so important to waging war. "Contractors
are currently supporting U.S. military forces in eleven countries.... Support ranges from
the operation of high-technology assets to maintenance of biological and chemical weapons
equipment... ."I" The American occupation of Iraq involves thousands of civilian security
personnel, truck drivers, and construction workers. 15 9 The Christian Science Monitor es-
timates that 20,000 contractors in Iraq are armed. 16° Moreover, the American military relies
on contractors to maintain and deploy its own weapons and vehicles.
In Afghanistan and Iraq, contractors are providing vital support on technologically advanced
military assets. Operation of the Predator un-manned aerial vehicle, for example, requires
152. Id. at (V).
153. Id.
154. Even if this statement is a whitewash on the part of prosecutors, it is the Principle of Distinction's
ambiguity that provided the opportunity for evasion. Disagreement over the meaning of the Principle of
Distinction is quite real, particularly so regarding dual-use targets and sophisticated weapons systems. See, e.g.
Wallis, supra note 83.
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contractor support because the vehicle is still in development. The military has not yet trained
Air Force personnel to use the Predator and therefore is dependent on contractors to execute
its proper operation.... In fact, many key assets, including the F- 117 stealth fighter, the MIA1
tank, the Patriot missile, and the Global Hawk unmanned drone, depend on contractor main-
tenance and operation.... 161
In short, contractors are critical partners of the armed forces. They are involved in every
aspect of wars, including tasks that, until recently, were carried out by the armed forces
themselves.62 Yet contractors are immune from attack unless they take "direct part in the
hostilities. " 161
Even when they do not engage in acts of war, lumping military contractors in with the
rest of the civilian population is not an inevitable feature of humanitarian law. International
law already acknowledges that some captured civilians, including contractors, deserve POW
status because of their level of involvement in wars.1M Thus, some of the laws of war already
acknowledge that not all civilians are equally distant from the armed forces. Distinction,
however, ignores that reality. Given "[tlhe close connection between these civilians and
military operations, and the often consensual nature of their involvement in the form of
contracts," it is not at all clear that contractors deserve the same level of protection as
uninvolved civilians.65 Yet such is the law.
A similar illogic protects settlers as well. Civilians who settle in occupied lands enjoy the
full protections of Distinction, regardless of their instrumental roles in solidifying control
over captured land. Even when settlers are sponsored and supported by the occupying
power, they may not be targeted unless they take a "direct part in hostilities."'
66
Hundreds of thousands of settlers live in occupied land around the world. In Israel/
Palestine alone, 440,000 Israelis live on land claimed by Palestinians. 61 The 8000 settlers
in Gaza have been removed, but another 230,000 in the West Bank and 200,000 in East
Jerusalem remain supported by the Israeli government. 168 These are not small outposts; the
largest settlement houses 25,000 people. 169
Nor are they independent of the Israeli government. Settlements in Gaza and the West
Bank are on land captured by the Israeli military during the 1967 and 1973 wars and sold
to Israeli citizens at discounted prices. 170 Settlers were encouraged to move into the occu-
pied lands with government subsidies, particularly by Likud Party governments.
The Likud governments, eager to keep the West Bank as part of Israel, actively promoted the
growth of the settler population through large subsidies-cheap land, low-interest mortgages
161. Mobley, supra note 158, at 24.
162. See generally id. (Cooking, cleaning, base operations, mail, vehicle maintenance, and refueling, are only
some of the tasks now performed by contractors).
163. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51.3.
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correspondents, members of labor units, civilian crews of military and civilian aircraft, and the crews of the
merchant marine.
165. See Watkin, supra note 14, at 16.
166. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51.3.
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and lower income tax rates for individuals, as well as subsidies to local government councils.
(Labor governments attempted to cut back on these subsidies but often met with political
opposition from their coalition partners.) Israelis moving to the West Bank side of the green
line could exchange a small three- or four-room apartment in a crowded Israeli town for a
bigger house in a low-density community, with government benefits not available to people
living just a few miles away inside Israel proper.171
As one academic puts it, Israeli settlements are "basically a case of suburban colonization."
1 72
Israel's strategy is not unique; the Sri Lankan government also uses civilian settlements
to control Tamil areas of its territory. Government resettlement efforts have resulted in
thousands of Sinhalese moving to Tamil-dominated portions of Sri Lanka.- 7 The effects
have been to reduce Tamil control over eastern provinces and to break up Tamil lands into
discontinuous areas. 7 4 The settlement policy has been taken to its most extreme form in
the government's Mahaweli project, planned since the 1960s. That program's goal is to use
74 percent of Tamil-settled areas for Sinhalese migrants.'75
Settlements in occupied land are not mere villages, shopping centers, and business dis-
tricts. They are instruments of the occupation itself. By displacing local populations and
building the infrastructure of governance, they increase an occupier's control over land. In
Israel and Sri Lanka, government-sponsored settlement takes place in the context of armed
insurgencies; they are responses to insurgency. Although the tools are civilian, the results
are military: pacification and de facto annexation. Like armies, settlements are tools of
conquerors. Yet because they are civilians, settlers, unlike soldiers, cannot be attacked.
C. MIXING AMBIGUITY WITH CLARITY
As a doctrinal matter, the Principle of Distinction protects both civilians and civilian
objects. Yet Distinction does not apply in the same way to these two categories. Regarding
civilians themselves, the requirements of Distinction are certain; regarding civilian objects,
Distinction's requirements are disputed. Distinction is thus precise and imprecise and am-
biguous and clear at the same time. This dichotomy benefits powerful actors.
Distinction's ambiguity regarding dual-use targets gives wealthy and powerful states the
freedom to attack enemies' infrastructure, often using advanced weapons that avoid placing
their own soldiers in harm's way. A ban on targeting civilians themselves is little hindrance
to these actors, who can literally destroy their enemies' ability to fight.
The situation is quite different for weak actors, particularly those who lack the ability to
project force against their enemies' civilian objects. The upshot of Distinction for these
combatants is that they are severely limited in their targeting decisions. Powerful states can
pay contractors to fight their wars and encourage settlers to effect their occupations, but
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Meanwhile, modern armies can legally attack insurgents. Without resources or wealth,
weak parties cannot use the civilian sector to help fight their wars; they must engage in
combat on their own, and thus become legitimate targets under the laws of war. "[T]he
'haves' . . . are the ones taking greatest advantage of the economies and efficiencies offered
by an advanced civilian economy," and under the Principle of Distinction, that shields them
from attack. 7 6 Powerful states can follow the law of Distinction because it barely restrains
them at all; Distinction's mix of ambiguity and clarity plays to the strengths of powerful
actors.
D. FAIRNESS AND EQUALITY
It is unfair to create a legal standard that handicaps insurgents. Societies that are under
occupation are occupied not just by soldiers, but also by civilian contractors and settlers.
Preventing insurgents from attacking these people does nothing but protect powerful states;
it entrenches the status quo. If the international community is willing to recognize that
some insurgencies are legitimate-and it has done so in the past-then it must also be
willing to grant those insurgencies the tools they need to achieve their goals.'77 Unless the
law changes, insurgents will be forced to reject the laws of war, because to do otherwise
would mean defeat.7s The result is warfare without rules or restraints. The Principle of
Distinction is not only unfair; it is also unwise.
Nonetheless, Distinction has its defenders. Michael Schmitt argues that the laws of war
exist to save lives, not to level the playing field between adversaries. "One would certainly
hope that those who share humanitarian commitment would not advocate sacrificing the
all-too-limited protection non-participants in armed conflict enjoy, merely to render war
more equitable."' 19 According to Schmitt, fairness and equality arguments simply miss the
point. Under that view, pressure to change the law "result[s] from treating humanitarian
law as if it were designed to ensure a fair fight rather than protect non-participants from
the effect of hostilities, a dangerous trend from the humanitarian perspective." 80 Yet
Schmitt has lost sight of the prize.
Schmitt's rejection of equality and fairness as criterion by which to judge Distinction is
too positivist, and is inconsistent with constitutional jurisprudence in many countries.
American constitutional law, for example, often gives far greater weight to procedural values
such as equality than to details of legislation: witness the Fourteenth Amendment.' Our
176. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 171.
177. For example, the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and the American Revolution.
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society has decided that laws that apply unequally, particularly those that disproportionately
benefit the powerful, are inherently unjust regardless of their policy justifications.
Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the Principle of Distinction actually protects
any civilians from attacks. Insurgencies in Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Sri Lanka all target
civilians without regard to international law. Major powers already target civilian objects,
reasoning that they have dual uses. Abandoning Distinction would not increase the risks to
civilians, and creating a doctrine to which insurgencies could subscribe would only help
matters. Rejecting the Principle of Distinction does not mean abandoning humanitarian
law, but changes do need to be made.
V. Conclusion
The Principle of Distinction is not protecting civilians from harm. Insurgencies ignore
it, major powers bend it to suit their needs, and all the while innocent people pay the price.
Distinction might even make wars more dangerous by encouraging insurgents to reject
humanitarian law. Distinction, therefore, must go. Yet Distinction cannot simply be dis-
carded; it should be replaced.
A. THE NEED FOR A REPLACEMENT
If Distinction was abandoned and no doctrine took its place, targeting decisions would
still be governed by the Principles of Necessity and Proportionality. These Principles alone
are inadequate. Imagine an asymmetrical war between an insurgency and a technologically
sophisticated opponent. 82 For the insurgent, it might be militarily useful to attack any of
the opponent's civilians, regardless of their connection to the war itself. The insurgent
reasons that by raising the civilian cost of the war, it would increase anti-war sentiment
among the opponent's population and lead to withdrawal. If the insurgent had few other
tactics available to it, attacks on random civilians could rise to the level of military necessity.
Furthermore, a few hundred deaths, or even a few thousand, might be proportionate in
light of the goals to be obtained. After all, far higher death tolls occur during conventional
warfare and humanitarian law does not blink an eye. This sliding-scale interpretation of
Necessity and Proportionality is entirely rational, though not widespread. Regardless, Dis-
tinction forbids this desperate calculus from ever taking place, and rightly so.
Necessity and Proportionality are each context-dependant. Because they follow balancing
approaches to target selection, they permit weak actors to attack almost anything or anyone
associated with an enemy. The weaker the actor, the more powerful his attacks can be. In
other words, these principles barely restrain insurgents at all. What is needed is a rigid
third doctrine that, like Distinction, places some targets off-limits no matter the circum-
stances. But unlike Distinction, that new doctrine should be realistic and recognize that (1)
insurgents sometimes have legitimate reasons to attack civilians and (2) not all civilians
deserve the same level of protection.
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF CULPABILITY
This paper suggests that the Principle of Distinction be replaced with the Principle of
Culpability. Focusing on the potential target's association with the war, it provides that
182. One might call such a place Iraq or Israel.
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It is impermissible to intentionally attack civilians or civilian objects unless the target voluntarily:
a) Enters or remains in a contested area or area of combat and
b) Performs actions intended to achieve military goals of the combatants
The biggest difference between Culpability and Distinction is that Culpability classifies
potential targets individually.83 Whereas Distinction lumps all civilians together, Culpa-
bility looks at what roles each potential target plays in the conflict. Culpability pairs this
detailed scrutiny with a voluntariness requirement, based on the moral assumption that it
is unjust to attack targets who are not responsible for their participation in the war.
The requirement that the target enter or remain "in a contested area or area of combat"
serves two functions. The first is notice-it ensures that civilians will not become valid
targets without knowing that they are subject to the laws of war. The second is to prohibit
attacks on civilian targets that, although they contribute to the war effort, are physically
located outside the war itself. Humanitarian law is inherently a compromise between con-
taining violence and allowing justified use of force. Because modem militaries are premised
on maintaining an enormous civilian military-industrial capacity, the list of potential targets
includes much of the civilian world. Drawing a doctrinal line around the battlefield prevents
violence from consuming entire societies.
The requirement that the target "performs actions intended to achieve military goals of
the combatants" limits attacks to those civilians who have chosen to become part of the
conflict. It protects aid workers, journalists, and trapped civilians, and provides complete
immunity for all civilians unless they act as adjuncts to a military. This requirement is
premised on the notion that civilians who pursue military goals are not logically distinct
from the military itself. Furthermore, it ensures that wealthy or powerful combatants cannot
immunize themselves from attack by outsourcing their wars to civilians.
In practice, the Principle of Culpability would both permit and forbid attacks that the
Principle of Distinction allows. For example, Culpability would permit attacks against set-
ters in contested areas because they pursue the military goal of occupying territory. Like-
wise, Culpability would permit attacks against contractors employed by the military in war
zones because these contractors engage in precisely the same conduct as their military
colleagues; there is no rational basis on which to distinguish them from each other. Cul-
pability would resolve the question of dual-use facilities by protecting them from attack.s4
Although this limitation might prolong some conflicts, that is the price for containing
violence.
The voluntariness requirement itself would constitute a major change in the laws of war
because it would apply to soldiers as well as civilians. Conscripts would receive the same
protections as uninvolved civilians because, as conscripts, it cannot be said that their par-
ticipation in the conflict is voluntary. Initial attacks against a conscript military would there-
fore have to be directed at the elements of the enemy that did become involved voluntarily,
183. A similar result could be obtained by interpreting Distinction's "taking a direct part in hostilities"
standard to include civilian actions such as settling land or providing support to armed forces in the field of
combat. Such a redefined Principle of Distinction would approach the Principle of Culpability that is described.
However, it would be less honest. Culpability openly rejects the categories of "civilians" and "combatants."
Redefining Distinction, while simultaneously continuing to profess the immunity of civilians from attack, would
at best be misleading. Better to change the law than to bend an old law to meet new needs.
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such as officers specifically, and command and control targets generally.' Once those lead-
ership targets were disabled, any conscripts who continued to fight could be presumed to
do so voluntarily now that their coercers were removed. Conscripts would then be subject
to attack.
Although application of Culpability might be unclear in some instances, this uncertainty
is not as destructive as that attending Distinction. Unlike Distinction, whose core uncer-
tainty is masked by the deceptive public face of categorical prohibition, Culpability would
bring debate about the ethics of targeting into the open. Distinction sweeps difficult moral
issues under the rug preferring an unfair standard to hard questions about who deserves to
be attacked. But so long as we are willing to kill other people, we should face those ques-
tions. Culpability makes us do so by requiring individualized targeting decisions based on
real facts, not false categories.
Culpability represents a major shift in international law in favor of weak actors. This is
inevitable because the problems with Distinction stem from the fact that it was written by
and for powerful states. In fact, Distinction is so skewed in favor of the powerful that weak
actors must reject it. Legal reforms have to address this imbalance in order to succeed. By
responding to this problem, Culpability would result in systemic benefits that make reform
worthwhile. It would create a system of humanitarian laws that insurgents could follow
without crippling themselves. Hopefully, this would encourage insurgents to follow the
laws of war and even if it did not, it would make enforcing these laws against insurgents
fairer and more legitimate. Although many would find it imperfect, at least they might find
it acceptable. The result would be increased rule of law, regulation of conflicts, and less
violence.
The Principle of Culpability is not the only legal reform that is possible. However, Cul-
pability highlights the serious shortcomings of the law as it is. Distinction has failed, and
until it is replaced innocent civilians will continue to die.
185. This might not require significant changes in military tactics. American military planners already em-
phasize attacks against an enemy's leadership, as witnessed in the initial days of both Gulf Wars.
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